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Abstract
In this chapter, I will discuss what it takes for a dynamical collapse theory to
provide a reasonable description of the actual world. I will start with discussions of
what is required, in general, of the ontology of a physical theory, and then apply it to the
quantum case. One issue of interest is whether a collapse theory can be a quantum state
monist theory, adding nothing to the quantum state and changing only its dynamics.
Although this was one of the motivations for advancing such theories, its viability has
been questioned, and it has been argued that, in order to provide an account of the
world, a collapse theory must supplement the quantum state with additional ontology,
making such theories more like hidden-variables theories than would first appear. I will
make a case for quantum state monism as an adequate ontology, and, indeed, the only
sensible ontology for collapse theories. This will involve taking dynamical variables to
possess, not sharp values, as in classical physics, but distributions of values.
1 Introduction
The issue of how to interpret dynamical collapse theories is one that has been much
discussed in the literature. As originally construed, such theories were taken to be ones
according to which the wave function is everything (it would be better to say: physical
reality is exhausted by whatever it is in the physical world that the wave function
represents). The viability of this has been questioned, and it has been argued that
dynamical collapse theories, in order to afford a description of a world anything like
the one we live in, must be supplemented by additional ontology, making such theories
more akin to the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory than they might originally have
seemed.1 If one accepts such an argument, then one is left with a choice to make of
primitive ontology, resulting in distinct, but empirically equivalent, theories, depending
on choice of ontology.
This chapter will not attempt to survey these discussions. Rather, I will try to
make a case that the appropriate way to think of such theories—indeed, I will argue,
the only sensible way—is still quantum state monism. On a quantum state monist
1Allori et al. (2008) is the locus classicus.
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approach there is nothing over and above the quantum state. There must, however,
be physical objects such as tables and chairs and laboratory equipment. If the theory
is to describe a world in which there are such things, a quantum state monist must
adopt the proposal, made early on in these discussions, of revising the way we at-
tribute physical properties to systems, from the strict eigenstate-eigenvalue link to a
slightly relaxed criterion on which we can talk of a system possessing a property if the
state is close enough to an eigenstate of the operator corresponding to that property.
These possessed properties do not, however, exhaust the ontology; a full account of the
world, according to these theories, is one on which dynamical quantities almost never
have precise values, but rather, have distributions of values, an account that has been
developed and advocated by Philip Pearle (2009).
We will begin with some general considerations about what it takes for a physical
theory to give an account of the world. I will first argue for the need for what Bell
called “local beables,” and then proceed with an analysis, which will draw heavily on
Newton’s own thoughts on the matter, of what is required in order for a theory to
represent a world of physical objects located in space.
Many of the discussions about these matters have invoked conformity to common
sense or to intuition as a means to judge the acceptability of proposals concerning
ontology. This, it seems to me, is an inadequate basis for making such judgments.
We have no reason to expect either common sense or intuition to be reliable guides
to what the world is like, or to what the world could be like. Our common sense and
intuitions are likely to be shaped by contact with aspects of the world in which quantum
phenomena do not reveal themselves and things behave quasi-classically. Further, it
should be uncontroversial that quantum mechanics is counterintuitive in some aspect
or another. And even when it comes to classical physics, our intuitions can lead us
astray. Some readers will, I expect, take the Newton-inspired account of physical
objects offered in section 3, below, to violate some of their intuitions about what things
are. This should not be taken as an objection; as always, when we find ourselves in the
grip of an intuition, we should ask of it whether it can survive scrutiny and be turned
into a considered judgment. Any intuitions one might have that are at odds with the
account given, I claim, fail to survive such scrutiny.
For an argument for quantum state monism, along different lines but to a conclusion
that I take to be compatible with, and complementary to, the one advanced in this
chapter, see Peter J. Lewis’ contribution to this volume (Lewis, 2017). For a contrary
view, see Roderich Tumulka’s contribution (Tumulka, 2017).
2 The need for things to be met with in space
What is required for a sensible ontology for a physical theory? We must certainly not
presuppose that the world must conform to our prejudices about the way things are.
If there is one thing that we have learned from the history of science, it is that science
can teach us that the world differs in some fairly drastic ways from what we might
have otherwise thought.
We are open to learning that the world is radically different from what everyday
experience or the science of ages past might suggest. Does this entail an “anything
goes” attitude towards the ontology of physical theory? Not quite. The conclusions
of science, radical as they may be, gain their credibility, and their right to be taken
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seriously, by virtue of being supported by empirical evidence. The process of gathering
such evidence involves manipulation of experimental and observational apparatus, and
recording of the results of experiments and observations, which are then used as input
for theory construction and theory testing (and, of course, this is a dialectical process,
as theory informs and guides our experimentation and observation). If, via this process,
one arrived at a theory with no room for any such things as experimental apparatus
in its ontology, one would find oneself in an awkward position, as the theory would
undermine its own empirical base. This would be peculiar situation. Though there is
no logical contradiction involved in the supposition that everything that we have taken
to be an experimental result is in fact an illusion, we should bear in mind that what
we are pursuing is not merely a logically consistent account of the world, but one that
we have some reason to believe is at least approximately correct in its broad outlines.
This cannot be if the theory is empirically self-undermining. To say that a theory is
empirically self-undermining does not entail that it is false, but it does entail that we
do not have good reason to believe in its truth.
Our empirical evidence is based on experience. As Tim Maudlin (2007) has empha-
sized, it does not follow that an adequate physical theory entail facts about experiences
of conscious beings. Physics proceeds while the mind-body problem remains a vexed
question. Our evidence is based on manipulations and observations of experimental
apparatus, and, if we are able to represent this apparatus within the theory, at least in
a schematic way, so that we are in a position to compare how the apparatus is observed
to behave with what the theory would lead one to expect of it, then we are in a position
to test the theory empirically, and gain evidence for or against the theory.
This is nothing new. Consider, for example, the case of Newtonian gravitational
theory, applied to the solar system. The evidence base is observations of planetary
positions from various observatories. The theoretical treatment consists of positing
a mass distribution—which consists, for example, of representations of the planets
and the sun by means of points with which are associated appropriate masses—and
studying the evolution of this mass distribution under gravitational interactions. Once
this is done, there is still the matter of connecting the theory with observations. There
is a superb discussion of this by Howard Stein, in a paper entitled, “Some Reflections
on the Structure of Our Knowledge in Physics.”
Let me underscore the point that there can be no thought of deducing ob-
servations within that framework. To do so in the strict sense, one would
need to have a physical theory of the actual observer, and to incorporate it
into the Newtonian framework. I certainly do not want to say that there
is a reason “in principle” why such a thing can never be done, for any pos-
sible (future) physical framework; but everyone knows that Newton could
not do it, and that we—in the best versions of our own physics—cannot do
it. Even waiving the theory of the observer, it is clear that all astronom-
ical observations are intermediated by light; therefore, to deduce anything
like observations, one would have to include the theory of light within the
framework (Stein, 1994, p. 649).
What we do, instead, is represent the observer (or, more accurately, the observatory)
schematically within the theory.
One represents the observer within the spatio-temporal framework by a
worldline (or a system of world-lines). Putting in—for the gravitational
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theory of the solar system—the world-lines of the planets and satellites, as
calculated from suitable initial data, one can then determine at each instant
all the relevant angles between lines drawn from the observer to the bodies
of the system (including, if the theory is properly handled, with the earth
represented as an extended body and its rotation treated systematically,
lines from the observer to terrestrial landmarks). As a first approximation,
such lines are treated as lines of sight. With more sophistication on the
observational side, the results are turned over to the experts in observational
astronomy, who will take such account as they are able to of atmospheric
refraction, of aberration of starlight, and so on (p. 650).
A few comments about this. First of all, there can be no question of trying to ascertain,
from the mathematical structure of the theory alone, what the components of the
mathematical structure are supposed to represent. One knows, from the beginning,
which world-line is meant to be the world-line of the Sun, which of Jupiter, of the
Earth, etc.. The formalism is from the outset a physically interpreted formalism.
Some philosophers have imagined a set of explicit “correspondence rules” providing
the link between the formalism employed in physical theory and the physical systems
to be represented. There is something right about this, but also something misleading.
Physicists’ treatments of physical systems typically include verbal descriptions of what
it is that the variables introduced into the analysis are meant to represent. But, as Stein
himself rightly emphasizes, the connection of the theoretical apparatus to observational
practice is never wholly explicit; it is something learned in practice, and, for the case of
laboratory experiments, in the lab, via actual experience with the relevant instruments.
Second, Newtonian gravitational theory is a theory only of a limited aspect of
physical phenomena. As Stein emphasizes, it does not treat of the behaviour of light
or of the interactions of ponderable matter with light, and, as such, does not treat
of the key attribute of the Sun and the planets that permits us to gain information
about where they are. But it is an intelligible project to extend the theory so as to
include these aspects, and to embed Newtonian gravitational theory within a theory
that also treats of light and its interactions with matter. Moreover, any theory with
any pretensions of being in principle a comprehensive account of the physical world
would have to include this extension.
At the close of the paper, Stein adds some remarks about quantum mechanics. “In
this theory, we just do not know how to ‘schematize’ the observer and the observation”
(p. 653). It might be better to say: we do not know how to schematize experimen-
tal apparatus and experimental results. That this is not a straightforward matter
within the usual framework of the theory is precisely what gives rise to the so-called
measurement problem. More on this in §4, below.
3 What is it to be a material body?
3.1 The Newtonian conception of bodies
It must, therefore, be possible to represent, at least schematically, within a theory that
has the potential to be a comprehensive one, the sorts of things that our experimental
devices are. Let’s pause for a moment and ask: what does it take to be such a thing?
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On this matter, there is an interesting discussion, at the very birth of modern
physics, by Isaac Newton, in a manuscript entitled “De gravitatione et æquipondio
fluidorum,” unpublished until 1962. In this manuscript Newton attacks, among other
things, the Cartesian doctrine that the essential attribute of body is extension. Newton
distinguishes body from extension, and, indeed, accepts that there are extensions—that
is, extended regions of space—that are not the locations of bodies. What, then, we
may ask Newton, is the difference between extended regions that are the locations of
bodies, and those that are not?
To explain his answer to this question, Newton presents a sort of creation myth.
it must be agreed that God, by the sole action of thinking and willing, can
prevent a body from penetrating any space defined by certain limits.
If he should exercise this power, and cause some space projecting about the
Earth, like a mountain or any other body, to be impervious to bodies and
thus stop or reflect light and all impinging things, it seems impossible that
we should not consider this space to be truly body from the evidence of
our senses (which constitute our sole judge on this matter); for it will be
tangible on account of its impenetrability, and visible, opaque and coloured
on account of the reflection of light, and it will resonate when struck because
the adjacent air will be moved by the blow.
Thus we may imagine that there are empty spaces scattered through the
world, one of which, defined by certain limits, happens by divine power to
be impervious to bodies, and ex hypothesi it is manifest that this would
resist the motions of bodies and perhaps reflect them, and assume all the
properties of a corporeal particle, except that it will be motionless. If we
may further imagine that that impenetrability is not always maintained in
the same part of space but can be transferred hither and thither according
to certain laws, yet so that the amount and shape of that impenetrable
space are not changed, there will be no property of body which this does
not possess. It would have shape, be tangible and mobile, and be capable of
reflecting and being reflected, and no less constitute a part of the structure
of things than any other corpuscle, and I do not see that it would not equally
operate on our minds and in turn be operated upon . . .
. . . In the same way if several spaces of this kind should be impervious to
bodies and to each other, they would all sustain the vicissitudes of corpuscles
and exhibit the same phænomena. And so if all this world were constituted
of this kind of beings, it would hardly seem to be any different in character.
And hence these beings will be either bodies or like bodies. If they are
bodies, then bodies can be defined to be determinate quantities of extension
which the omnipresent God affects with certain conditions: these are (1) that
they be mobile (and therefore I have not declared them to be numerical parts
of space, which are strictly immobile, but only definite quantities which may
be transferred from space to space). (2) That two such be unable in any
part to coincide, or that they be impenetrable and so when by their motions
they meet they obstruct one another and are reflected in accordance with
certain laws. (3) That they be able to excite various perceptions of the
senses and the fancy in created minds, and in turn to be moved by the
latter . . . . (Newton, 1962, pp. 139–140).
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Some readers, familiar with the all-too-common attribution of spacetime substantival-
ism to Newton, will be tempted to gloss Newton’s ontology as: the basic ontology is
space, with the properties that are characteristic of bodies, impenetrability, opacity,
and the like, being attributes of some regions of space. As if anticipating this reading,
Newton takes pains to make it clear that he rejects it.
Perhaps now it may be expected that I should define extension as substance
or accident or else nothing at all. But by no means, for it has its own
manner of existence which fits neither substances nor accidents. It is not
substance. . .
. . . although philosophers do not define substance as an entity that can act
upon things, yet all tacitly understand this of substances, as follows from the
fact that they would readily allow extension to be substance in the manner
of body if only it were capable of motion and of sharing in the action of body.
And on the contrary they would hardly allow that body is substance if it
could not move nor excite in the mind any sensation or perception whatever
(Newton, 1962, pp. 131–132).
Space itself is not a substance. Where the requisite dynamical conditions hold, there
is a material body, and Newton explicitly denies that those conditions must inhere
in some substantival substrate, itself devoid of properties, which Newton rejects as
unintelligible.
for the existence of these beings it is not necessary that we suppose some
unintelligible substance to exist in which as subject there may be an inherent
substantial form . . . .
Between extension and its impressed form there is almost the same anal-
ogy that the Aristotelians posit between the materia prima and substantial
forms, namely when they say that the same matter is capable of assuming
all forms, and borrows the denomination of numerical body from its form.
. . . They differ, however, in that extension (since it is what and how consti-
tuted and how much) has more reality than materia prima, and also in that
it can be understood, in the same way as the form that I assigned to bodies
(Newton, 1962, pp. 140–141).
A few comments about this “creation myth” of Newton’s are in order. First, how-
ever central the agency of God was to Newton’s thought about the physical world,
reference to divine decree is not essential to the account of body that he presents.
What matters is that it be a matter of physical law that the requisite conditions hold
in the relevant regions, whether or not one takes those laws to issue from divine decree.
Second, though Newton talks as if there is an absolute distinction between rest and
motion, nothing in the account requires this, which is equally at home in Galilean or
Minkowski or some other relativistic spacetime.
Third, the various dynamical properties, such as opacity, reflectivity and impene-
trability, can be separated. For example, a body need not be impermeable, or may
be permeable to some sorts of things and not others, or permeable to various degrees
to various sorts of things. Though Newton took it for granted Jupiter and Saturn are
impenetrable, and seemed to assume that his readers would, too,2 we now know that
2See the remarks to the Third Rule for the Study of Natural Philosophy in the Principia: “We find those
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they are giant balls of gas. They nonetheless share with other extended bodies the
properties of reflectivity and mobility.
Fourth, as illustrated by the cases of Jupiter and Saturn, the region occupied by
a body need not have sharp boundaries. Sharp as the visual boundary of Jupiter nay
seem to be through your favourite telescope, the upper atmosphere does not a precise
upper boundary, and any precise delimitation of it would have to involve an element of
convention. One might, perhaps, imagine that the atmosphere is composed of smaller
parts, atoms or molecules, which themselves have precise regions that they occupy,
and that any ambiguity in the boundary of Jupiter has to do only with which of these
well-located particles to include as its parts. But there is no necessity for bodies to be
composed of parts like this. All of the dynamical properties that make a body a body
are a matter of degree, and it would not detract at all from their status as bodies if
the intensity of these properties did not go abruptly to zero outside a precisely defined
region but, rather, dropped off sharply, quickly becoming negligible outside a region
that is only specifiable within some tolerable limits of fuzziness.
Fifth, though Newton expresses some doubt about whether the bodies that make
up our world are the kind of being he describes, he rightly says that, if this world
were constituted of this kind of being, it could hardly be said to be any different in
character. Mobile quantities of extension endowed with the right sorts of dynamical
properties would be bodies, whatever else might be true of them, and, without the right
sort of dynamical properties, nothing could be said to be a body or to have a location
in space.
With these qualifications, there seems to something deeply right about Newton’s
account of body. To be a body is to have a certain sort of place in a network of
dynamical relations. A dynamically inert substrate for dynamical properties is neither
needed nor intelligible. Moreover, these considerations are independent of the details
of physical theory, and may justifiably be taken as a constraint on any physical theory
that has any pretense to include in its ontology things to be met with in space.
One consequence of the Newtonian view of a physical body is worth mentioning.
One might be tempted to consider, as a skeptical hypothesis, a supposition that there
is, in fact, no table in front of me, merely a region of empty space that, by God’s
decree, looks and feels and in all ways like a table. Our Newton-inspired conception of
physical body declares this to be nonsensical. There is nothing more to being a table
than to act in every way like a table.
3.2 Is talk of “primitive ontology” helpful?
In an influential and in many ways insightful paper, Allori et al. (2008) argue that the
ontology of any physical theory can be partitioned into primitive ontology, which is
meant to be what the theory is primarily about, and non-primitive ontology, whose
role it is to provide dynamics for the primitive ontology.
I understand the motivation for talk of this sort in the context of Bohmian me-
chanics. This theory is primarily about the motion of the Bohmian corpuscles, and
the role of the wave function is to guide the motion of these corpuscles. It is less clear
bodies that we handle to be impenetrable, and hence we conclude that impenetrability is a property of all
bodies universally.” (Newton, 1999, p. 795). This is explicitly extended to the heavenly bodies in the last
paragraph of the remarks on Rule 3.
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to me that all physical theories fall naturally into this mode. And there seem to me
to be some risks associated with this way of thinking. One risk is to fall into thinking
that the local beables that make up ordinary objects must be part of the fundamen-
tal ontology of the theory. This is not a condition placed on the ontology in Allori
et al. (2008), but it is a natural extension of this way of thinking, and it is taken as
a requirement in Allori (2013). Another risk is regarding the non-primitive ontology
as unreal. Again, this is not a step by taken in Allori et al. (2008), but it is taken in
Allori et al. (2014, p. 332).
The most serious danger, though, it seems to me, is the danger of sliding into think-
ing that there is a two-step process. First, one posits an ontology, with no dynamical
assumptions, that is, no assumptions about how it behaves, and then one posits a dy-
namics for it. This suggests that it could make sense to speaking of something being
present that is dynamically inert. This, again, is not a pitfall that Allori et al. (2008)
fall into, though they come close when they say, “The wave function in each of these
theories, which has the role of generating the dynamics for the PO [primitive ontology],
has a nomological character utterly absent in the PO” (Allori et al., 2008, p. 363).
This is, however, a step taken by Esfeld (2014) and by Esfeld et al. (2017), who posit
“primitive stuff, materia prima, having no physical properties at all” (p. 135), matter
points possessing only metrical relations to each other.
The problem with this is that, until we have said something about how the pur-
ported ontology acts, we have haven’t yet given sense to the claim that it is there at
all. What it is for an object to occupy a region of space, or, indeed, to have any sort
of spatial relations to anything, is for it to do something there—exclude other objects,
or reflect light, or something of the sort.
There is a potentially misleading analogy with classical planetary physics. Eudoxus,
Ptolemy, Copernicus, Tycho, and Kepler took the existence of the planets for granted,
and sought to learn how they move, and it was Newton who finally gave us dynamical
laws for their motions. One is tempted to proclaim, existence precedes dynamics!
The reason this is misleading is obvious from consideration of how locations and
motions were attributed to the planets in the first place. It was taken for granted
by all those researchers that the planets were located in the regions from which they
reflected light. That is, certain aspects of the way that these bodies interact with
things were used to attribute to them spatial relations to other things, and then these
spatial relations were used to investigate the ways in which their locations (or, rather,
relative locations) changed with time. A dynamically inert object could not be said to
be located anywhere, or to have distances from other dynamically inert things.
4 Schematizing experimentation in quantum me-
chanics
Now let us take a look at how one might go about schematizing experiments and their
results, within quantum mechanics, with an eye to what goes wrong.
First, a few words about how one sets up a quantum representation of a system,
say, a hydrogen atom, to invoke the theory’s first serious physical application.
One first identifies some dynamical variables of the system of interest, for exam-
ple, position and momentum of the electron and of the proton that make up a hy-
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drogen atom. One then associates with these variables operators—Dirac called them
“q-numbers”—on which are imposed the appropriate commutation relations. One then
constructs a Hilbert space for the operators to act upon. A (pure) state of the system
in which it has a given value of a dynamical variable is represented by a vector that
is an eigenvector of the corresponding operator. This is readily extended to mixed
states; a mixture of pure states that are represented by eigenvectors of an operator
with a common eigenvalue is a state in which the system has the corresponding value
of the dynamical variable. This interpretational rule, which is half of the eigenstate-
eigenvalue link, is the primary means by which a Hilbert space vector can be taken
to indicate anything at all about a physical system. Thus, for example, if a hydrogen
atom is in a state in which its total energy is E, that fact is indicated by taking the
vector that represents its state to be an eigenvector, with eigenvalue E, of the operator
associated with the total energy of the system.3
It is useful to distinguish between the two halves of the eigenstate-eigenvalue link.
Let us call the conditional, “If the state of a system is an eigenstate of an operator
corresponding to some dynamical quantity, the system possesses the corresponding
eigenvalue” the positive eigenstate-eigenvalue link, and its converse, obtained by re-
placing “if” with “only if,” the negative eigenstate-eigenvalue link. The positive link
is indispensable for interpreting the quantum formalism as any sort of physical theory
at all; the negative eigenstate-eigenvalue link leads to trouble.
Some experiments double as preparation procedures. These are the repeatable ex-
periments, those that, if repeated on the same system, are sure to yield the same result.
It is natural to suppose that, after such an experiment, the system indeed possesses the
corresponding value of the variable in question. And, indeed, this was introduced as
an explicit postulate, the collapse postulate, in von Neumann’s Mathematische Grund-
lagen der Quantenmechanik (1932), whence it made its way into the second edition
(1935) of Dirac’s Principles of Quantum Mechanics (it does not appear in the first
edition of 1931). In Dirac’s formulation, “a measurement always causes the system to
jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is being measured, the eigen-
value this eigenstate belongs to being equal to the result of the measurement” (Dirac,
1935, p. 36).
How are we to schematize the process of performing an experiment in quantum
theory? We schematize the experimental apparatus as a quantum system with at least
as many distinguishable states as there are distinguishable outcomes of the experiment.
Among its dynamical degrees of freedom there is a “pointer observable” whose role it
is to indicate the outcome. We assume an interaction between the system of interest
and the apparatus that is such that, if the initial state of the system of interest is an
eigenstate of the quantity to be “measured,” then the apparatus will end up indicating
it, which is taken to mean: the apparatus will end up in the appropriate eigenstate
of the pointer observable. And therein lies the problem. Unless we assume a collapse
postulate, the interaction between the system and apparatus, when the initial state
of the system is not an eigenstate of the quantity to be “measured,” will lead to
an entangled state of system and apparatus that is not an eigenstate of the pointer
observable. The eigenstate-eigenvalue link leaves it somewhat mysterious what we
3David Wallace (2013, p. 215) has claimed that “the E-E link has nothing much to do with quantum
theory” and that “it seems to be purely an invention of philosophers” (Wallace, 2012, p. 4580). Gilton
(2016) has decisively shown, with ample documentation of the relevant texts, that this is false.
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are to make of such a state. The prescription that, if the state of the apparatus
is an eigenstate of the pointer observable, the value of the pointer observable is the
corresponding eigenvalue, tells us nothing about what to say when the state is not an
eigenstate. If we add the converse, “only if,” then we conclude that the pointer is not
pointing to any result, and that experiments don’t have outcomes, which is hard to
make sense of. We can, of course, deny that the pointer observable has a definite value
only if the apparatus’s quantum state is an eigenstate of the pointer observable; this
leads us to posit structure beyond the quantum state.
The quantum state monist, if she is to hold on to the usual assumption that exper-
iments have unique definite outcomes, must modify the dynamics so as to avoid states
in which the pointer fails to point. This is where the collapse postulate comes in. A
dynamical collapse theory, taken as a candidate for a solution to the measurement prob-
lem, is meant to be a substitute for the problematic versions of the postulate found
in textbooks, a substitute that avoids the textbook postulate’s invocation of “mea-
surement” or “experiment” as a primitive concept, and avoids also the problematic
assumption of two distinct sorts of processes, those that transpire during a measure-
ment, and those that transpire at all other times. That is, a theory of this sort is meant
to provide, to borrow from GRW’s title (Ghirardi et al., 1986), unified dynamics for
microscopic and macroscopic systems.
5 Ontology for ideal collapse theories
Let us entertain, for the duration of this section, the fiction that we could construct a
dynamical collapse theory that succeeded in producing, and maintaining, eigenstates
of some physical quantity. Which variables should these be, in order for the theory
to be capable of yielding a world full of things to be met with in space? And, if we
could choose an appropriate quantity, would this be sufficient, or would there still be
something missing from the world?
Ghirardi et al. (1995) argue that a smeared mass density fills the bill. To avoid
complications arising from relativity, suppose we have a nonrelativistic quantum field
theory (that is, it permits particle creation and annihilation), containing particle types
that may be indicated with an index k (associated with each type is a characteristic
mass, charge, spin, etc.). Let ψˆ†k(x, t), ψˆk(x, t) be creation and annihilation opera-
tors for particles of type k, satisfying the usual bosonic or fermionic commutation or
anticommutation relations, and define particle number density operators by
Nˆ (k)(x, t) = ψˆ†k(x, t) ψˆk(x, t). (1)
We can use these to define smeared number operators. Given a non-negative, real-
valued function g with ∫ ∞
−∞
d3x g(x) = 1, (2)
we define
Nˆ (k)g (r) =
∫ ∞
−∞
d3x g(x− r)Nˆk(x). (3)
To get a feel for this, if g(x) is taken to be constant within a sphere of radius a centred
on the origin, and zero outside it, then Nˆ
(k)
g (r) would be the operator corresponding
10
to type-k particle number in a sphere of radius a. That is, its expectation value, in
any quantum state, would be the expectation value of the result of an experiment that
counts the number of k-type particles in that sphere. An eigenstate of this operator
would be one in which there is a definite number of k-type particles in the sphere.
Given a smearing function g, one can define smeared mass density operators by
weighting particle numbers with their masses and summing over all particle types:
Mˆg(r) =
∑
k
mk Nˆ
(k)
g (r). (4)
There are principled reasons for choosing variables of this sort as the ones that a
collapse theory will tend to make definite; see Ghirardi et al. (1995) and Bassi and
Ghirardi (2003) for discussion. The mass density should be smeared over distances
small on a macroscopic scale, but large compare to atomic dimensions to avoid excessive
narrowing of wave packets, to keep the unavoidable energy increase that accompanies
collapse within acceptable limits.
For a toy version of a smearing of this sort, partition all of space into disjoint cubes
with sides of a length a, a length that is small on the macroscopic scale but large
compared to atomic dimensions—say, 10−5 cm., which is small on the human scale of
things but is nevertheless 10, 000 times the Bohr radius, and, for each of these cubes,
define a smeared mass density operator via a function that is uniform over that cube.
Let us imagine a dynamical collapse theory whose stable states are eigenstates of mass
density smeared uniformly over these cubes, and tolerates superpositions of distinct
values of these smeared mass densities for time intervals that are minuscule on the
human time scale. Could this theory describe a world of macroscopic objects anything
like our own?
The answer, I think, is yes, but some argumentation is required to reach this. There
is a temptation to think the answer is simple. The theory will include stable states
in which there is a table-shaped region in this room of mass density higher than its
surroundings, and might be tempted to say that we can simply declare that, according
to the theory, that is what it is to be a table. But this is too quick, because we need
assurance that this table-shaped region has the right sort of dynamical properties to
make it a table. Does it reflect light? Of what frequencies? What happens if I place
my mug-shaped region of high mass density on the upper boundary of the table-shaped
region?
These questions have some urgency because the dynamical properties of a table—its
stability, its capacities to reflect light and to support mugs, and the like—are chiefly
a matter of its electromagnetic interactions with other things, and to specify a mass
density and to say nothing more is to say nothing about electromagnetic properties.
One could consider also smeared charge densities, but, since our cell size is large com-
pared to atomic dimensions, for ordinary matter charge densities smeared over such
regions will be zero or near-zero. Nonetheless, the electromagnetic properties of ordi-
nary objects are crucial to their being what they are. A table-shaped region of high
mass density composed entirely of electrically neutral matter would not hold its shape
except momentarily, nor would it reflect light or support a mug, which would pass right
through it without resistance.
An analysis that pays heed to the details of the quantum state yields the correct
answer. A table is not merely a mass density located in a table-shaped region, but a
structure composed of nucleons and electrons in bound states, forming atoms, which
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are bound together in a more-or-less rigid configuration. Our quantum state, which,
by supposition, localizes a mass corresponding to definite integral multiples of particle
masses in each of these cubes, will be one such that includes many-body correlations
between the positions of the various constituents. Even if the location of a single
nucleon is somewhat indefinite within the cube, it will be correlated with the positions
of the other nuclei that make up the atomic nucleus of which it is a part, and the
position of the nucleus of the atom will be correlated with its electrons. Thus, even
though the smeared charge density might be zero within a cube, and even if there is
not a definite matter of fact about the charge distribution within the cube, it will be a
matter of fact that the charge is not uniformly zero within the cube, and that positive
charges corresponding to atomic nuclei are surrounded by clouds of negative charge.
This means that a photon that impinges on a table-region will interact primarily with
outer shell electrons, and be absorbed or reflected. It also means that interactions
between my mug-shaped region and the table-shaped region will be dominated by
outer shell electrons, and that they will repel each other at short range.
Thus, the image we get from the theory, of regions of high mass density that behave
much like we expect classical objects to behave, depends heavily on features that we
regard as peculiarly quantum. In order for there to be stable atoms and molecules, let
alone stable macroscopic objects, it is necessary for electron wave functions to be spread
out over atomic and molecular distances. It also depends on quantum multiparticle
correlations; though the nucleus of an atom might have its center-of-mass wave function
spread out over a region of the size of the localization scale, there will be correlations
on a finer scale between the positions of the individual nucleons, and between the
positions of the nucleons and their accompanying electrons.
Upshot of this: A collapse theory that yielded eigenstates of mass density smeared
over regions that are small on the macroscopic scale but large enough to permit internal
goings-on at the atomic scale to proceed unmolested, would, indeed, solve the problem
of yielding a description of a world containing things to be met with in space, but
this is dependent on the physical reality of features of the quantum state that go well
beyond the mass density it represents. The other features of the world represented by
the quantum state are an integral part of the ontology.
6 Ontology for near-collapse theories
6.1 The fuzzy link
In the previous section, we entertained the fiction of a collapse theory that yielded
eigenstates of the mass content of the elements of a partition of space into cubes that
are small on the macroscopic scale, and argued that, in conjunction with other aspects
of quantum theory, a theory like that can, indeed, yield an adequate description of a
world containing things to be met with in space. On such a theory, there is a matter
of fact about how much mass there is in each of the little cubes. The theory admits
states in which there are regions of high mass density that have the requisite dynamical
properties to count as bodies in the Newtonian sense.
Instead of this fictional theory, let us consider the actual Continuous Spontaneous
Localization theory (CSL) (Pearle 1989, Ghirardi, Pearle, and Rimini 1990). This
differs in two ways from our fictional theory. One is that, instead of a uniform smearing
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function over a precise region, Ghirardi, Pearle, and Rimini employ a smooth smearing
function, a spherical Gaussian, characterized by a width a. The corresponding smeared
number operators, which we will call simply Nˆ (k)(r), can be thought of as an average
number of particles in an imprecisely defined region of roughly size a3. The other
difference is that the theory does not produce eigenstates of the corresponding smeared
mass-density operators, but, instead, tends to suppress superpositions of states in which
there is a substantial spread in the value. That is, it will tend to suppress (but not
completely eliminate) superpositions of states that correspond to differences in these
smeared mass densities.
To get a feel for this, consider two macroscopic regions, A and B, separated by
a macroscopic distance. Let |ψA〉 be a state in which there is a large number N of
atoms mostly localized in A. That is, the many-particle wave-function for this state,
ψ1(x1, . . . ,xN ), has non-negligible amplitude only when all of x1, . . . ,xN are in A. Let
|ψB〉 be a state in the same number of atoms are localized in B. The states |ψA〉 and
|ψB〉 could be states that are close to eigenstates of the smeared mass density operators
everywhere, but an equally weighted superposition of the two, or any superposition
with non-negligible coefficients for both of these, would not be close to an eigenstate
of Nˆ(r) for r within the respective regions in which the states |ψA〉 and |ψB〉 localize
the particles. A state like that would tend to collapse into one in which most of the
mass density is in either A or B.
Most, but not all; the theory produces only approximations to eigenstates of the
smeared mass density operators. The fact that collapse theories do not produce eigen-
states of anything like our familiar physical quantities, but at best approximations to
them, has been called the “tails problem.”4 This feature of collapse theories moti-
vated, on the part of the developers of such theories, a modification of the eigenstate-
eigenvalue link.
if one wishes to attribute objective properties to individual systems one has
to accept that such an attribution is legitimate even when the mean value
of the projection operator on the eigenmanifold associated to the eigenvalue
corresponding to the attributed property is not exactly equal to 1, but is
extremely close to it (Ghirardi et al. 1990, p. 1298; see also Ghirardi, Grassi,
and Pearle 1991, p. 114, Ghirardi and Pearle 1991, p. 39, Ghirardi, Grassi,
and Benatti 1995, p. 13).
This modification has been dubbed, by Clifton and Monton (1999), the fuzzy link.5
A state |ψ〉 is an eigenstate of an operator Aˆ if and only if the variance of Aˆ in that
state,
V(Aˆ) = 〈ψ|Aˆ2|ψ〉 − 〈ψ|Aˆ|ψ〉2, (5)
is equal to zero. One way to estimate closeness to being an eigenstate of some variable
is to use the criterion that its variance be small. Ghirardi, Grassi, and Benatti (1995)
apply this criterion to mass densities. They say that the smeared mass density in the
4This was first flagged as a problem by Shimony (1991), and by Albert and Loewer (1991).
5Peter Lewis (2016, pp. 86–90) distinguishes between a fuzzy link, according to which there is some
precise threshold p such a system possesses the property A = a if and only if 〈Ψ|Pa|Ψ〉 > 1− p, and a vague
link according to which possession of a definite property is a matter of degree. It is hard to imagine what
arguments there could be (or even what it might mean) for there to be a precise threshold. Albert and
Loewer (1996) argue, correctly in my opinion, that there could be no such precise threshold, and that the
modified link must be somewhat vague. This is what I mean by a fuzzy link.
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vicinity of a point r is objective if and only if the variance of Mˆ(r) is small compared
to the square of its mean value:
V(Mˆ(r))
〈ψ|Mˆ(r))|ψ〉2  1. (6)
In some later works (Ghirardi and Grassi, 1996; Ghirardi, 1997a) the mass density is
said to be “accessible” if this criterion is satisfied.
How close is close enough? Obviously, to pick a precise fixed threshold would be
every bit as arbitrary as picking a precise upper limit to Jupiter’s atmosphere. The
dynamics of the theory should be our guide, as well as our capacities to discriminate
between quantum states. If the spread of some physical quantity is too small to be
discernible, then the state’s behaviour will not be appreciably different from that of
an eigenstate, and we have license to disregard the difference. Ghirardi et al. (1995)
justify the criterion by arguing that, when the criterion (6) is satisfied, things behave
as if there is a classical mass in the smearing region equal to the expectation value of
the smeared mass density.
This proposal is an application of the fuzzy link to the smeared mass densities.
That is, it is a proposal about when, in the context of a dynamical collapse theory, we
should regard the state as one in which we should say that there is a physical quantity
that is sufficiently well-defined as to have, in effect, an objective value. It remains an
interpretation on which “the statevector is everything” (Ghirardi and Grassi 1996, p.
368; see also Ghirardi 1997a, p. 364, Ghirardi 1997b, p. 233).
In a world like this, crucial physical quantities, such as the amount of mass in a
given region of space, fail to have precise values, though they may come very close
to having a precise value, in the sense of satisfying the accessibility criterion. Some
readers will balk at this. A proposal of this sort, it might be said, offends intuition,
or common sense. However, as we have said already in the introduction, we have no
reason to take common sense or intuitions to be reliable guides as to how the world
is. We should ask: can a case be made that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, the
world cannot be like that?
Any attempt at such an argument is doomed to fail. It seems to me that anyone
who accepts the following propositions, which strike me as incontrovertible, should
accept that the world could, indeed, be like that.
• To be a physical body is nothing more and nothing less than to have a certain
place in a network of dynamical and causal relations of the sort discussed in
section 3.
• An ideal collapse theory, if there could be one, on which sufficiently large regions
of space contained perfectly definite quantities of mass, would, provided that the
dynamics of the theory underwrote the right sort of dynamical behaviour of these
masses, would be capable of delivering a sensible description of a world much like
ours.
• Given the dynamics of a theory like CSL, a small difference in a state makes only
a small difference to dynamical behaviour.
This is an application of a more general Principle of Continuity for metaphysics. If
certain states of a physical theory are capable of bearing some metaphysical burden,
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then a slightly different state is capable of bearing the same burden. If this continuity
principle were not accepted, it seems to me, then we would not be capable in engaging
in metaphysics at all, as any physical theory we have ever formulated, and any physical
theory that we are likely to formulate in the foreseeable future, is at best some sort of
approximation to a deeper, more fundamental theory. And, even if we were handed an
exact theory on tablets of stone, we would still only know the physical states of things
within a certain degree of approximation.
This perspective on ontology—that it is really how things interact with other things
that counts—suggests a natural choice for the variables that the collapse theory will
tend to make definite. As interactions can be represented by terms in a complex
system’s Hamiltonian, a natural choice would be energy density, or, in a relativistic
context, the stress-energy tensor. In a non-relativistic approximation, most of a massive
object’s energy is in its rest mass, and so the energy density would approximate a mass
density, and arguments that a mass density makes for an adequate ontology would
carry over.
6.2 Adding primitive ontology
There is in the literature another option, which has become more popular in recent
years, for interpreting collapse theories.
For any state |Ψ〉, whether or not it is at all close to an eigenstate of any of the
operators Mˆ(r), one can define the expectation value.
m(r) = 〈Ψ|Mˆ(r)|Ψ〉. (7)
If one is dissatisfied with the fuzzy link, which involves vagueness at the level of basic
ontology, an alternative is to postulate, as additional ontology over and above the
quantum state, a mass density that always exists, and always has the value, at any
time and place, given by (7). This can be thought of as introducing the mass density
as primitive ontology.6 This option has the advantage of being more in accord with
classical intuitions. The mass density, always definite, is like a classical mass density,
with the chief difference that it is subject to unclassical dynamical laws. There’s no
question, intuition tells us, of what we’re talking about, on a theory with this primitive
ontology.
This, it seems to me, is an illusion. The reason is, essentially, precisely the rea-
son that led Ghirardi and co-authors to distinguish between mass densities that are
objective, or accessible, and those that are not.
The relation between quantum states and mass density functions is obviously many-
one. A mass density function is uniquely determined by a quantum state, but the
same mass-density function can correspond to many different quantum states. This is
illustrated by an example discussed by Ghirardi et al. (1995). Consider two spherical
regions, A and B, and consider two quantum states. The first state to be considered,
|Ψ⊕〉, is an equally weighted superposition of two states, |ΨAN 〉 and |ΨBN 〉. In |ΨAN 〉, a
large, even number of particles, of total mass M , are all located (within the tolerances
6As far as I can tell, this proposal first appears, explicitly, in Goldstein (1998). It is discussed extensively
in Allori et al. (2008). It should be mentioned that Ghirardi has adopted this view of the status of the mass
density, and now regards it as “an additional element which need to be posited in order to have a complete
and consistent description of the world” (Ghirardi, 2007, p. 2907).
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permitted by the theory) in the region A, and evenly distributed within it. In |ΨBN 〉,
the same holds of B. The state |Ψ⊕〉 is,
|Ψ⊕〉 = 1√
2
(|ΨAN 〉+ |ΨBn 〉) . (8)
The second state to be considered, |Ψ⊗〉 is one in which each of the regions A, B
contains half of the particles.
|Ψ⊗〉 = |ΨAN/2〉⊗|ΨBN/2〉. (9)
The two states yield the same mass-density function, taking on a value corresponding
to 12M in A and
1
2M in B. But there is a difference between the physical conditions
of the regions in those two states. This can be seen by the behaviour of a test particle
projected along a line that passes directly between the two regions, and which is at-
tracted gravitationally to the masses within those regions. In state |Ψ⊗〉, the particle,
being attracted equally by both masses, passes undeflected. In state |Ψ⊕〉, by contrast,
even though the mass density takes on the same values that it does in state |Ψ⊗〉, the
reaction of the test particle is very different. If initially well-localized, its state will
become entangled with that of the other masses, so that the state of the whole system
ends up being a state that is a superposition of two terms, in one of which the test
particle is deflected towards A, and in the other, deflected towards B.
In state |Ψ⊕〉, do each of the two regions contain a mass 12M? It is not enough
to simply declare this to be true; not even God could create masses in those regions
in the absence of physical laws that ensure that they act like masses. And, in a state
like |Ψ⊕〉, other things do not act as if there are those half-masses in those regions.
Something that you might be inclined to call a “mass,” if it doesn’t act like a mass,
is not a mass. There is no sense in which, in a state like |Ψ⊗〉, regions A and B each
contain mass 12M .
Only when the function defined by (7) acts like a mass density are we justified in
calling it one. And this is only when it satisfies the criterion of “accessibility.”
But this means that nothing is added by taking there to be additional ontology,
beyond the quantum state. The mass density m acts like a mass density only when
the accessibility criterion is satisfied, and, when it does, the quantum state dynamics
alone ensure that everything behaves as if a mass density were present. I am for this
reason in agreement with Ghirardi and Grassi, when they write,7
For the reader who has followed the above analysis, it should be clear that,
within CSL, physical systems are fully described by the state vector which
evolves according to equations embodying genuine elements of chance. How-
ever, even though the state vector is everything . . . , since the dynamics itself
tends to make objective the mass density, it turns out to be appropriate to
relate the kinematical elements in Bell’s sense to the mass density distribu-
tion.
. . . In a sense we could state that the exposed beables of the theory are
the values of the mass density function and that, at the appropriate level,
the dynamics allows one to take them seriously. All other properties which
7Parallel passages, differing only in minor matters of wording, can be found in Ghirardi (1997a, pp.
363–364) and Ghirardi (1997b, p. 233).
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emerge as a consequence of this process derive from this basic dynamical
feature concerning the mass density function (Ghirardi and Grassi, 1996, p.
368)
Though the mass density function is singled out by the dynamics as the one that
is almost always “accessible,” it does not exhaust what there is in the world. Other
quantities, such as charge densities, could get carried along with the mass density, and,
when they satisfy the criterion of accessibility, they are no less real than the mass
density.8 A region of space that acts as if it contains a certain charge does contain that
charge; no sense can be made of a claim that only the masses are real and that other
physical quantities have an inferior ontological status. Their reality may be emergent
as a consequence of the dynamics, but emergent is not the same as unreal.
To some readers, it will seem as if I am smuggling in unwarranted presuppositions.
The thought would go something like this. In the absence of additional ontology, a
quantum state is just an abstract object, a vector in a Hilbert space, or else something
like a field on a high-dimensional space with no intrinsic relation to things in three-
dimensional space. It is only when additional ontology is introduced, ontology on
three-dimensional space, and the quantum state placed in the role of guiding that
ontology, that it has some relation to our three-dimensional space.
This line of thinking—which, admittedly, has become prevalent in the literature—
seems to me to misconstrue the nature of quantum theories. We are not presented with
an abstract Hilbert space, with no built-in relation to anything physical, or, worse
with a mysterious function on a high-dimensional space. To construct a quantum
theory, one first identifies a target system, with certain dynamical degrees of freedom.
One then follows the quantization heuristic to construct a quantum theory of that
system, replacing the canonical dynamical variables with operators obeying appropriate
commutation relations. Insofar as the dynamical degrees of freedom are associated
with certain regions of space, so are the operators that we associate with them, and
the eigenvalues of those operators represent possible stable values of those quantities,
and eigenstates of those operators represent states in which those values obtain in the
appropriate regions of space. All we are doing is extending this representation, via
continuity, to states that are not eigenstates.
If a quantum state were a vector in a Hilbert space that had no built-in association
with dynamical quantities, there would be a serious problem with taking it to represent
anything physical, as the intrinsic structure of such a space would not distinguish one
vector from another. If a quantum state were a field on configuration space, with no
built-in relation to dynamical quantities such as energy or charge density or the like,
or, worse, if it were a field on a high-dimensional space with no built-in relation to our
familiar three-dimensional space, then there would, indeed, be a serious problem with
taking it to describe a world anything like ours. If that is what quantum states were,
then we would, indeed, need to posit additional ontology above and beyond the wave
function. But taking a quantum state to be something like that involves, it seems to
me, an almost willful forgetting of what quantum theories are.
8Shan Gao (2017, §6.2.1) argues, along similar lines, for the reality of charge densities when a charged
system is well localized and hence the state is an eigenstate (or close to it) of charge density.
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6.3 A comment on “flash ontology”
Goldstein (1998) and Allori et al. (2008) adapt a suggestion of John Bell to formulate an
alternate primitive ontology for the GRW theory, which they call the “flash ontology.”
Bell describes his proposal as follows.
There is nothing in this theory but the wavefunction. It is in the wavefunc-
tion that we must find an image of the physical world, and in particular
of the arrangements of things in ordinary three-dimensional space. But the
wavefunction as a whole lives in a much bigger space, of 3N -dimensions. It
has neither amplitude nor phase nor anything else until a multitude of points
in ordinary three-space are specified. However, the GRW jumps (which are
part of the wavefunction, not something else) are well localized in ordinary
space. Indeed each is centered on a particular spacetime point (x, t). So
we can propose these events as the basis of the ‘local beables’ of the the-
ory. These are the mathematical counterparts in the theory to real events
at definite places and times in the real world . . . A piece of matter then is
a galaxy of such events. As a schematic psychophysical parallelism we can
suppose that our personal experience is more or less directly of events in
particular pieces of matter, our brains, which events are in turn correlated
with events in our bodies as a whole, and they in turn with events in the
outer world (Bell 1987, in Bell 2004, pp. 204–205).
Unlike Bell, for whom the jumps, or hitting events, are “part of the wavefunction, not
something else” (it would be better to say: are events in the evolution of the wave-
function), Allori et al. propose that these events be taken as self-subsistent primitive
ontology, distinct from the wave function, whose role is to furnish a probability distri-
bution over possible sequences of flashes. We then have two distinct physical theories,
with the same stochastic equation of motion for the wave function: GRWm, which is
the GRW theory with mass-density ontology, and GRWf, GRW theory with the flash
ontology.
As Allori et al. note, a table or chair will be the locus of a great many flashes per
second—they estimate an order of 108 flashes per cubic centimeter for solid matter. On
a smaller scale, the flashes would be rarer. In particular, on this theory, in a region of
space that we are inclined to take to be the locus of a living cell, the interval between
flashes will be of the order of 103 seconds, something like one flash per hour. About this,
in a footnote that responds to a comment by a referee, they write, “there is presumably
no cell in GRWf, though the structure of the wave function (on configuration space—
even though there are no configurations) might suggest otherwise” (p. 362, fn. 5).
Of course, this does not mean that, if we look through a microscope at that region
in which there is no cell, we will see nothing. On the contrary, the photons or electrons,
as the case may be, employed by the microscope will become entangled with the wave
function of the non-existent cell, and the amplification process will eventually record
the image in some medium involving a macroscopic number of atomic nuclei, enough
so that the encoded image of a cell will be discernible in the pattern of flashes in the
recording medium. We will have formed an image of something that does not exist.
Moreover, unlike the case of properties of quantum systems to which the quantum
state assigns nothing like a determinate value prior to interaction with experimental
apparatus—cases in which we should, indeed, say that the recorded result does not
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represent a fact that obtained prior to the interaction—it is possible to prepare the
living cell in such a way that an observation will predictably and reliably produce an
image of a cell in a given location.
We should ask: what are we saying, here? Can we coherently acknowledge that is
true of a given region of space that it reacts, predictably and reliably, in these ways to
microscopes and other instruments, and, indeed, to anything else that might interact
with it, exactly as if a cell is present, and at the same time deny that there is a cell
present? The supposedly nonexistent cell would (as Newton put it) no less constitute
a part of the structure of things than the bodies realized in the primitive ontology. We
are being asked to draw an ontological distinction between dynamical potentialities
associated with regions in which there is primitive ontology, and those located in empty
space, with only the former counting as real objects. It is as if an Aristotelian, rejecting
the Newtonian conception of body, declared that the only genuine bodies were those
in which the dynamical properties flagged by Newton were realized in some materia
prima, and, further, declared that some of the apparent objects we interact with are
of this sort, and others, mere simulacra. All this is, literally and without hyperbole,
nonsensical.
7 Distributional ontology
Consideration of situations such as the one discussed in §6.2, above, makes it clear that
specifying a mean mass distribution (even if this were reified into primitive ontology)
does not exhaust the physical facts about mass distributions. Things are very different,
depending on whether the variance V(Mˆ(r)) is appreciable or not. We must, therefore,
take it that there is a matter of fact about what this variance is.
This suggests the following revision, advanced by Philip Pearle (2009), to the way
we attribute values to dynamical quantities. In classical physics, dynamical quantities
always possess precise values. In quantum theory, there is always some imprecision, but,
if the spread is small enough—that is, if the state is close enough to an eigenstate—we
may treat it as one in which the quantity has a precise value. But the full reality is that
associated with each dynamical variable is a distribution of values. This distribution,
though formally like a probability distribution, is to be thought of, not as a probability
distribution over a precise but unknown possessed value, but as reflecting a physical,
ontological, lack of determinacy about what the value is.
On this proposal every dynamical variable possesses some distribution. A collapse
theory will tend to narrow the spread of the distributions of some of these quantities,
and, when the distribution is sufficiently narrow, everything will be almost exactly as
if the quantity has a precise value, and it can be treated as if it were precise. If we
are seeking objects that behave like our familiar macroscopic objects, it is to those
variables that we should direct our attention. But the spread-out distributions of the
other variables are no less part of physical reality.
An analogy might help. For many purposes, in dealing with solar system dynamics,
the planets can be treated as if they have precise, point locations. They don’t, of course.
Suppose, then, we wanted to develop a more nuanced concept of location of Jupiter.
One refinement is to note that Jupiter is extended, and we could choose a certain
region, an oblate spheroid, as the region in which Jupiter is located. But Jupiter’s
atmosphere does not have a precise upper boundary. The location of Jupiter is neither
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a determinate point in space nor a determinate region of space.
On this proposal, all dynamical physical quantities are like that. Take a spatial
region R, and consider the quantity of mass in that region, M(R). Classically, this
would have a point value. On the distributional ontology, it does not have a precise
value, but might have, instead, a distribution9 whose density function looks something
like that depicted in Figure 1. A state in which the distribution for M(R) was like that
would be nearly an eigenstate of the property corresponding to M(R) lying within
the interval [0.5, 1.5]. It would be even more nearly an eigenstate of the property
corresponding to M(R) lying within the interval [0, 2]. For any interval ∆ of the real
line, we can consider the projection onto the subspace that, by the positive eigenstate-
eigenvalue link, corresponds to M(R) being in ∆. Any state vector can be written
as a sum of a component within that subspace and a component orthogonal to that
subspace If the ratio of the norm of the component within that subspace to the norm of
the state vector is close enough to unity, close enough for the difference to be negligible,
then we are justified in asserting that the value of M(R) lies in that interval.
Figure 1: A hypothetical density function for a mass-value distribution
Such assertions will be somewhat elliptical, as they carry an implicit degree of
tolerance, which can be made explicit. That is, assertions that the value of a physical
quantity lies within a given interval are really what Philip Pearle (2009) calls qualified
possessed value attributions.
Consider a state |ψ〉 for which
‖Pˆ (M(R) ∈ ∆)|ψ〉‖2
‖|ψ〉‖2 ≥ 1− ε, (10)
9Don’t confuse this distribution, which is a distribution of values for the mass within a fixed region of
space, with a mass distribution that attributes various mass-contents to various regions of space.
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where Pˆ (M(R) ∈ ∆) is the projection onto the subspace for which M(R) is in the
interval ∆, and ε is some small number (say 10−40, as suggested by Pearle (1997)).
Applying the usual probability rules to outcomes of experiments, the probability in
such a state that a measurement of mass in R will yield a value within ∆ is at least
1−10−40, which means that “100 billion people making measurements every picosecond
for 10 billion years can expect only one erroneous prediction” (Pearle, 1997, p. 151).
This seems enough to warrant the claim that we can reliably predict the result of such
an experiment, and that there is a fact of the matter about the region R, that it will
respond in the affirmative to an experiment to determine whether its mass content is
in ∆.
However, in our attribution of properties to physical systems, we should not take
“experiment” as a primitive term.10 Worse, this way of speaking might be taken to
presume that experimental outcomes have unqualified definite values, whereas, on this
account, every physical quantity, including the pointer variables of our experimental
apparatus, is distribution-valued. We should be a bit careful about what it means, on
this account, to say that we can reliably predict the result of an experiment.
A good experimental apparatus is one such that the dynamics of the theory will lead
to near-sharp pointer values. Moreover, the sharpness of such pointer values is limited
only by the resources we have available to us in building the apparatus. So, when we
attribute a qualified possessed value to the proposition M(R) ∈ ∆ with tolerance ε in
a state |ψ〉, the operational import of this is the following.
For any δ > 0, no matter how small, it is possible for there to be another
system, with an indicator variable Π, whose spectrum includes indicator
regions Π+ and Π−, such that:
1. If applied to an eigenstate of M(R) ∈ ∆, the indicator variable will end
up in Π+ within tolerance δ.
2. If applied to an eigenstate of M(R) /∈ ∆, the indicator variable will end
up in Π− within tolerance δ.
3. If applied to the state |ψ〉, with probability at least 1− ε, the indicator
variable will end up in Π+ within tolerance δ.
That is, we attribute properties to systems on the basis of their potential responses
to other systems, and the tolerances invoked have to do with probabilities of various
responses. Those responses, in turn, will be responses of distribution-valued variables,
and will be themselves the subjects of qualified value attributions.
Is there a threat of circularity here? There might be, if we had no handle on the
meaning of any of these value attributions. But they are anchored by the positive
eigenstate-eigenvalue link. As the tolerance ε shrinks, a state in which a certain dy-
namical quantity has a given value within a tolerance ε approaches an eigenstate with
that eigenvalue, and, as a consequence of that, its behaviour approaches that of the
eigenstate. Recall that our quantum theory was set up in the first place with an identi-
fication of certain dynamical variables of interest, and an association of operators with
10This is why I choose to say that qualified value attributions are qualified by specifying a tolerance,
whereas Pearle speaks of them as qualified by the probability that the statement is false. There is nothing
wrong with this way of speaking, if it is understood in the way that is outlined below, but it runs the risk of
suggesting that we are taking experiment as an unanalyzed primitive, and not something to be schematized
within the theory.
21
those variables. We know what it means to attribute to a system a definite value of
some dynamical quantity. To attribute an almost-definite value means: it behaves in
almost the same way as it would if it had the definite value.
8 Conclusion
A distributional ontology of the sort outlined above is, I claim, the natural way to
think about a world described by a dynamical collapse theory, if one takes the theory
seriously, on its own terms. Attributions of values to physical quantities will always
be qualified value attributions. The rationale for accepting qualified possessed value
attributions is that, as ε decreases without limit, any dynamical differences between
a state in which a quantity is possessed within tolerance ε and a state in which it is
possessed with zero tolerance—that is a state that, in accordance with the eigenstate-
eigenvalue link, the quantity is possessed without qualification—diminish without limit.
On the Newton-inspired conception of body, what it is for there to be bodies with
spatial locations (or even relative spatial locations) has to do with dynamical properties
associated with those locations, and there is nothing in that conception of body that
requires those properties to be point-valued.
This may run counter to some readers’ intuitions. Those intuitions might long for
an ontology on which everything is definite. They may long for an ontology in which
dynamical properties are predicated of some substrate that is conceptually capable of
being stripped of its dynamical properties. But neither the world nor physical theory
are in any obligation to conform to such intuitions. A world like ours could be the
way that a dynamical collapse theory says it is, and we should seriously entertain the
possibility that it is that way.
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